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The purpose of this paper is to give an overview over the fisheries for Norwegian spring 
spawning herring, mackerel and blue whiting and analyse how they are managed. The stocks 
under consideration are harvested by coastal states and distant water fishing states (DWFS).  
For herring, however, Norway, Russia, Iceland, the Faroe Islands and the EU are all coastal 
states with the stock not being exploited by any DWFS.  There have been difficulties in 
reaching agreement of the management for all three stocks. The reason for these problems is 
that the distribution of the stocks and the different countries’ fishing opportunities have 
changed from time to time, putting the existing management arrangement under pressure. 
Here we review the management and current sustainability of the fisheries. 
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According to the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA), straddling fish 
stocks and highly migratory fish stocks are to be managed by Regional Fisheries 
Management Organisations (RFMOs) (Bjørndal and Munro, 2003), consisting of coastal 
states and relevant Distant Water Fishing States (DWFSs). In the North East Atlantic there 
are several straddling stocks, including herring, mackerel and blue whiting that are exploited 
both within coastal states’ 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) and on the 
high seas. Management of such stocks poses special management problems.  
In this area, the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) represents the 
relevant RFMO (Bjørndal, 2009).   Essentially, and for the purpose of this article, NEAFC’s 
Regulatory Area consists of the North East Atlantic.  A subset of this, the high sea area 
known as “the Banana Hole” of the Norwegian Sea (between the mainland and the island of 
Jan Mayen) represents the Convention Area
1
.  While NEAFC sets quotas and other 
regulations in the Convention Area, it should be pointed out that it has no power to enforce 
them.   
The four main fisheries in the Regulatory Area are Norwegian spring spawning 
herring, mackerel, blue whiting and pelagic redfish.  In 2005, about 3.3 million tonnes, or 
31% of the North East Atlantic catch was taken in these fisheries of which about one million 
tonnes was taken in the Regulatory Area (Bjørndal, 2009).    
The stocks under consideration are harvested by coastal states and distant water 
fishing states (DWFS).  For herring, Norway, Russia, Iceland, the Faroe Islands and the EU 
are coastal states with the stock not being exploited by any DWFS.  Mackerel and blue 
whiting are harvested by the same countries, however, for these fisheries Russia is a DWFS, 
harvesting in the Banana Hole. 
The purpose of this paper is to give an overview over the fisheries for Norwegian 
spring spawning herring, mackerel and blue whiting and analyse how they are managed. 
Since 2000, the combined annual catch of these three species has varied between 2 – 3.8 
million tonnes.  As these figures indicate, the fisheries are very important both in terms of 
quantity and in terms of income and employment for participating countries. We will in 
particular analyse the management and current sustainability of the fisheries. 
The report is organised as follows: In section 2, some principles of cooperative and 
non-cooperative management of straddling fish stocks are discussed. Section 3 gives a 
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summary of the mackerel, herring and blue whiting stocks, their status, management 
measures, and implementation.  In section 4, the economics of the fisheries is analysed, while 
conclusions are presented in the final section. 
 
2.  THE MANAGEMENT OF STRADDLING FISH STOCKS2 
According to the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA), highly migratory fish stocks 
and straddling fish stocks are to be managed by Regional Fisheries Management 
Organisations (RFMOs), consisting of relevant coastal states and Distant Water Fishing 
States (DWFSs) with a “real” interest in the fishery.  This Agreement has now acquired the 
status of international law, although in principle it is binding only for the signatories.   
Highly migratory stocks are represented by tunas and tuna like fish.  Straddling fish 
stocks is a term for all fishery resources other than anadromous and highly migratory fish 
stocks, which are to be found both within the EEZ(s) and the adjacent high seas, and that are 
exploited by coastal states and DWFSs.  Mackerel, Norwegian spring spawning herring and 
blue whiting all fit this definition. 
Non-cooperative management of resources is likely to lead to overexploitation.  This 
is clearly evidenced by the three stocks under consideration, as will be discussed below.  
Based on game theoretic analysis, some basic principles of cooperative management have 
been derived.  Given the ability of players to communicate, under the right circumstances a 
stable cooperative management regime may be established.  At least three conditions must be 
met for a cooperative agreement to be preferred to competitive exploitation.  First, the 
solution must be Pareto optimal.  Thus, if one country is to gain more, it can only be at the 
expense of others.  Second, payoff from cooperation must be at least as great as under non-
cooperation, i.e., everybody must gain from cooperating.  Third, the solution must be time 
consistent or resilient. 
If side payments are introduced, the scope for bargaining increases.  Side payments 
may be introduced with a two-fold purpose:  First, to enhance the scope for bargaining.  
Second, to enhance the flexibility and the resilience of the cooperative arrangement.   
 According to the UNFSA, a RFMO is to be open to all states having a “real” interest 
in the fishery encompassed by the RFMO; this includes coastal states and “relevant” DWFSs.  
Would-be new members can only be excluded on grounds of non-cooperation.   
  Cooperative management of straddling fish stocks will likely be more difficult than 
cooperative management of «shared» fish stocks.  The key reason for this is that members of 
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an RFMO may change over time.  An example is provided by Iceland in the mackerel fishery 
as due to changes in the migratory pattern, mackerel has in recent years been found also in 
the Icelandic EEZ.  Under the terms of the UN Fish Stock Agreement, would-be new 
members cannot be barred from a RFMO unless they refuse to abide by the RFMO 
management regime. 
Economic analysis suggests that resolution of the new member problem may call for 
granting “charter” members of a RFMO de facto property rights to the relevant resources.  
Possible solutions to the problem may be that a new country may join only if an established 
country leaves, a waiting period for new entrants is introduced, or fees are imposed on new 
entrants.  Some of these issues depend critically on a legal interpretation of the UN Fish Stock 
Agreement.  
As is well known, many of the world fish stocks are seriously depleted (FAO, 2012).  
This applies to straddling stocks as well.  Therefore, many RFMOs will be faced with the task 
of rebuilding stocks.  To the degree this is successful, the incentives for new countries to enter 
the fishery increase.   
If RFMOs lead to successful cooperative resource management, relevant high seas 
adjacent to EEZ will become high seas in name only and the stock will be managed as a 
shared stock.   
Unforeseen changes in fish stocks’ migrations between national EEZs makes the issue 
of arriving at and maintaining cooperative agreements on total allowable catches (TAC) and 
the distribution of these among the interested nations difficult. «Zonal Attachment» is a 
concept that has been suggested as a way to overcome disputes on how to share the quotas of 
such fish stocks. The concept has been applied to the management of shared stocks between 
the European Union and Norway (see Bjørndal and Lindroos, 2004; Hannesson 2013a). 
Briefly, this works as follows. “Zonal attachment” of a stock is the share of the stock residing 
within a particular country’s EEZ, if necessary weighted by the time it spends in a country’s 
zone over a year. This, then, determines, or at least influences, the share that each country 
gets of the total catch quota for that stock. 
With the division of catch quotas based on zonal attachment of fish stocks, it is 
unsurprising that changes in fish migrations lead to a breakdown of existing agreements.  
This is an example that a cooperative agreement may not be time-consistent which was 
indeed the reason for the temporary breakdown in the cooperative management agreement for 
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Norwegian spring spawning herring during the period 2003-07 (table 2 below; see Bjørndal 
and Munro, 2012 for further analysis). 
However, the problems surrounding the zonal attachment as a basis for the division of 
overall fish quotas do not end there. One may ask whether zonal attachment is at all a suitable 
criterion to distribute fish quotas. The answer is “not necessarily”, as discussed by Hannesson 
(2006, 2007) in the context of a given zonal attachment. Further, when Hannesson (2013a) 
extended the analysis to the cases where the zonal attachment varies over time and more than 
one stock is involved, the results largely confirmed the previous results, where stock sharing 
on the basis of zonal attachment was shown as likely to be unacceptable, because it would 
give the player with a minor interest a worse outcome than he would get by pursuing his own 
interest in the absence of cooperation. However, Hannesson (2013a) also showed that the 
scope of cooperation is greater if countries share more than one stock. For this to happen, 
each country has to be a dominant player with respect to one stock. If a country is a minor 
player for both stocks we only have an extended version of the minor player problem 
(Hannesson 2013c). 
These results have empirical implications. As has often been pointed out, the 
countries involved share several stocks (herring and blue whiting, besides mackerel), all of 
which fluctuate over time in ways that seem largely uncorrelated. The idea has been put 
forward that it ought to be easier to agree on sharing these stocks if all of them were 
considered jointly. What these results have shown is that this is not necessarily the case 
(Hannesson, 2013a, b). The problem is that the Faeroe Islands and Iceland are minor players 
with respect to all of these stocks, and in that case agreement will not necessarily be any 
easier when considering all of them jointly. 
 
3. OVERVIEW OVER RELEVANT STOCKS 
 
3.1  Northeast Atlantic Mackerel 
The International Council for the Exploration of the Seas (ICES) currently uses the term 
“North East Atlantic Mackerel” (Scomber scombrus) to define the mackerel present in the 
area extending from ICES Division IXa in the south to Division IIa in the north, including 
mackerel in the North Sea and Division IIIa.  
The stock is historically divided into three components, with the North Sea 
component considered to be overfished since the late 1970s, and the western component 
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contributing the vast majority of biomass and catch to the stock (ICES, 2007a). For 
management purposes, they are treated as one stock because the stocks mix at times when 
they are jointly harvested (Kennedy, 2003). Therefore, fishing effort is in the main not 
directed at any one of the three separate components, but at a single combined stock. It has 
not been possible to calculate the total catch taken from the North Sea stock component 
separately because of the low stock size and low catches taken from Divisions IVbc, but it 
has been assumed to be 10,000 tonnes for a number of years (ICES, 2007a).  
Total catches peaked in 1979 at 843,000 tonnes, and more recently in 1993 and 1994 
around 820 000 tonnes (figure 1). They have remained at about 650,000 tonnes since 1995, 
but catches declined to around 473,000 tonnes in 2006 (1).  Subsequently they recovered, 
with catches of 735,000 tonnes recorded in 2009. 
ICES classify the stock as being harvested unsustainably. Spawning stock biomass 
(SSB) was around 2.5 million tonnes for the period 1992-99 but subsequently declined to 
1.75 million tonnes in 2002-03.  It has shown an increasing trend in recent years, with 2.98 
million tonnes recorded for 2010 (figure 1). Misreporting of catches is also a serious problem. 
The ICES Working Group on the Assessment of Mackerel, Horse Mackerel, Sardine and 
Anchovy (WGMHSA) has found substantial levels of unaccounted mortality, and these 
unaccounted removals have been estimated to be more than 60% of the reported catch (ICES, 
2007). The Coastal States, the EU, the Faeroe Islands and Norway, have adopted a series of 
control measures regarding the weighing and inspection of landings for mackerel that should 
help to resolve this problem. 
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Figure 1. Spawning Stock Biomass (SSB) and Catches (including discards) of Northeast 
Atlantic Mackerel 1980–2011 (million tonnes). 
Source: ICES Advice 2010, Book 9, table 9.4.2.7. ICES WGWIDE Report 2012 for 2010-11. 
 
A number of countries harvest mackerel.  Harvests by the main countries are given in 
figure 2.  According to the official catch statistics, in 2005 about 60% of the catches were 
taken by member countries of EU, followed by Norway (28%), Russia (9%), Faeroe Islands 
(2%), and Iceland (less than 0.1%).  In 2009, EU countries accounted for 53.5%, followed by 
Norway (19.2%), Iceland (18.4%), Russia (6.6%) and Faeroe Islands (2.3%).   The landings 
of the mackerel in the Convention Area and in the Regulatory Area in 2004 were reported to 
be 527,000 tonnes, and 41,000 tonnes, respectively (NEAFC, 2006). 
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Figure 2.  Catches of Mackerel by country in the Northeast Atlantic, 1995–2009.  Tonnes. 
 
While Iceland had virtually no harvest of mackerel up to 2007, this changed in 2008, 
when Icelandic pelagic fishing companies caught 112,000 tonnes of mackerel, increasing to 
116,000 tonnes in 2009.  This appears to be due to changes in the distribution pattern of 
mackerel which now partly migrate into the Icelandic EEZ. While Iceland had no quota and 
hardly any catches in the past, this is likely to change in the future. It also means that the 
mackerel “game” has changed, with essentially the appearance of a new coastal state. At this 
point it is still uncertain what impact this development may have on the management of 
mackerel (Hannesson 2013b).  
The fishery was regulated by an internationally agreed TAC. In addition a number of 
management measures are in place to protect the North Sea component of the stock that is 
considered depleted, and to protect juvenile mackerel.  
The international agreement for management of the mackerel fishery broke down 
after Iceland became a major player as of 2008.  Even when an agreement was in place, 
despite the attempts to control allowable catches, the landings have exceeded the annual 
TACs in most years (see table 1), sometimes by a considerable amount.  The situation 
appears to be worsening.  In 2009, the total agreed TAC was 605,000 tonnes, not including 
the unilateral Norway/Faroe Islands’ TAC first declared this year and the Icelandic TAC; the 
Advisory Committee for Fisheries Management (ACFM) catch was recorded at 735,000 
tonnes.  For 2010 there was no internationally agreed TAC. 
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Although the mackerel stock is at a high level, with spawning stock biomass 
estimated at 2.928 million tonnes for 2010 (figure 1), the fishery is considered unsustainable 
due to the fact there is no international management agreement for the fishery. 
 
Table 1:   Agreed TAC vs. catch of Northeast Atlantic Mackerel. ‘000 tonnes. 
 



















1987 Given by stock component 442 616 11 655 
1988 Given by stock component 610 622 36 680 
1989 Given by stock component 532 576 7 590 
1990 Given by stock component 562 580 16 628 
1991 Given by stock component 612 609 31 668 
1992 Given by stock component 707 729 25 760 
1993 Given by stock component 767 784 18 825 
1994 Given by stock component 837 794 5 821 
1995 Given by stock component 645 729 8 756 
1996 Significant reduction in F 452 509 11 564 
1997 Significant reduction in F 470 517 19 570 
1998 F between 0.15 and 0.2 549 627 8 667 
1999 F of 0.15 consistent with PA 562 585 n/a 640 
2000 F=0.17: Fpa 612 655 2 738 
2001 F=0.17: Fpa 670 660 1 737 
2002 F=0.17: Fpa 683 685 24 773 
2003 F=0.17: Fpa 583 600 9 670 
2004 F=0.17: Fpa 532 587 11 650 
2005 F=0.15 to 0.20 422 447 20 543 
2006 F=0.15 to 0.20 444 318
6
 18 473 
2007 F=0.15 to 0.20 502 558 8 579 
2008 F=0.15 to 0.20 458 420 27 611 
2009 F=0.15 to 0.20 605
7
 442 13 735 
2010 Harvest control rule ---
8
 - - 869 
2011 See scenarios - - - 939 
 
1
Data on discards and slipping from only two fleets. 
 
2 
Landings and discards from IIa, IIIa, IV, Vb, VI, VII, VIII, and IXa.  
3
All areas except some catches in international waters in II.  
4
 Catches updated in 2003 with revisions from SGDRAMA in 2002.  
5




Does not includes the unilateral Norway/Faroe Islands TAC first declared in 2009 and 
Icelandic TAC. 
8
No internationally agreed TAC for 2010. 
Source: ICES Advice 2010, Book 9 table 9.4.2.1, ICES WGWIDE Report 2012 for 2010-11 
catches. 
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From theoretical studies of fisheries games we know that non-cooperative equilibria 
can be extremely destructive. Could that be the case in the mackerel fishery? There is some 
reason to think so. The destructive non-cooperative equilibria in fisheries games are due to 
insensitivity of the unit cost of harvesting to the size of the fish stock, giving players 
maximising their individual profit an incentive to drive down the stock to a low and perhaps 
unsustainable level (Bjørndal, 1988). The technology applied in the mackerel fishery (mainly 
purse seining) is of a kind suspected to produce such stock-independent unit costs. Yet, when 
Hannesson (2013d) contrasted the outcome in the mackerel fishery with the predictions by 
the game-theoretic approach it stood out as surprisingly moderate. A possible reason is that 
unit costs might, after all, be stock-dependent, another that the parties could implicitly 
recognise the destructive character of a Nash-Cournot non-cooperative equilibrium and 
tacitly apply a moderate fishing strategy, even if not fully cooperative. 
 
3.2. Norwegian spring spawning herring 
The Norwegian spring spawning herring (Clupea harengus) or Atlanto-Scandian herring is a 
straddling stock that is distributed throughout large parts of the North-East Atlantic during its 
lifespan (Bjørndal et al., 1998) and (ICES, 2007b). The fishery is important for employment 
and revenue in many countries, including Norway, which records the largest annual harvest, 
Iceland, Russia, Faeroe Islands, and some other member countries of the EU (Bjørndal, et al., 
2004). The fishery for Norwegian spring spawning herring follows the migration of the stock 
closely as it moves from the wintering and spawning grounds along the Norwegian coast to 
the summer feeding grounds in the Faeroese, Icelandic, Jan Mayen, Svalbard, and 
international areas (ICES Advice to NEAFC, 2005). 
In the 1950s and the 1960s, Norwegian spring-spawning herring was a major 
commercial species and the stock was subjected to heavy exploitation (Bjørndal, et al., 2004). 
The annual harvest peaked at 2 million tonnes in 1966, but by this time the stock was in 
serious decline and by the late 1960s the mature stock was almost depleted due to overfishing 
(Bjørndal, et al., 1998). A large increase in fishing effort, new technology, and environmental 
changes contributed to the collapse of this stock by the late 1960 (ICES Advice to NEAFC, 
2005). Due to the moratorium that was put in place to allow an increase in the spawning 
stock, the stock recovered by the late 1980s/early 1990s (figure 3). 
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Figure 3. Spawning Stock Biomass (SSB) and Landings of Norwegian Spring-spawning 
Herring. 1980–2010. Mill. Tonnes. 
Sources:  Bjørndal and Munro (2012). 
 
Until 1994, the fishery was almost entirely confined to Norwegian coastal waters, but 
during the summer of 1994 there were also catches in the offshore areas of the Norwegian 
Sea for the first time in 26 years, due to the herring resuming its traditional migratory pattern 
(ICES Advice to NEAFC, 2005). In 1995, the Advisory Committee on Fishery Management 
(ACFM) of the ICES recommended a TAC of 513,000 tonnes, but participating countries 
ignored the recommendation and the collective harvest of Norway, Russia, Iceland, Faeroe 
Island and the EU exceeded 900,000 tonnes, almost twice the quantity recommended by 
ACFM (Bjørndal, et al., 1998). The fishery expanded further the subsequent year (figure 3). 
In 1996, the EU, the Faeroe Islands, Iceland, Norway, and Russia agreed to 
implement a long-term management plan for Norwegian spring-spawning herring. The 
management plan was part of the international agreement on total quota setting and sharing of 
the quota during the years 1997–2002 (ICES. 2007b). The Parties agreed to maintain a level 
of SSB greater than the critical level (Blim) of 2,500,000 tonnes, and to restrict their fishing on 
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the basis of a TAC consistent with a fishing mortality rate of less than 0.125 for appropriate 
age groups as defined by ICES for the year 2001 and subsequent years. 
In addition, there were a number of bilateral agreements between the countries 
involved. Fishermen from other countries were allowed to harvest part of their quota in the 
Norwegian EEZ and the control zone around Jan Mayen, which is under Norwegian 
jurisdiction, thus enabling them to harvest at a time of year when the herring contain more fat 
and thus are more valuable. Moreover, fishermen from other countries are allowed to land 
their harvests in Norway, which would tend to reduce transportation distances and thus 
increase the prices they would fetch. This policy would also benefit the Norwegian fish 
processing industry. Juvenile herring grow up in the Russian EEZ. To compensate Russia for 
not harvesting juvenile herring, which would imply growth overfishing, Russia is given a 
quota in the Norwegian EEZ. 
The management plans and coastal state agreements were suspended for four years 
between 2003 and 2006 due to the disagreement over allocation of quotas. In this period, the 
bilateral agreements between Norway and other countries were also suspended, except for the 
one between Norway and Russia regarding juvenile herring. 
In January 2007 however, the EU, the Faeroe Islands, Iceland, Norway and the 
Russian Federation signed an agreement on the management of this stock for 2007. The 
Parties agreed on a TAC for the Norwegian Spring-Spawning herring of 1.518 million tonnes 
in 2008. The allocation of the quotas is as follows: European Community 6.51%, Faeroe 
Islands 5.16%, Iceland 14.51%, Norway 61.00% and Russian Federation 12.82%.  The 
relative quotas have remained unchanged. 
The agreed TAC, compared to the actual catch and ICES advice over time, are shown 
in Table 2.  In 2005, the total landings in the Convention Area and in the Regulatory Area 
were approximately 1,254,000 tonnes, and 195,000 tonnes, respectively (NEAFC, 2006). 
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Table 2. ICES advice about Total Allowable Catch Quots (TACs), actucal TACs and catch 
quantity per year, 1995-2011. ‘000 tonnes. 
 
Year ICES advice TAC Catch Comment 
1995 513 900
a





   1,220 Norway, Russia, Iceland and the 
Faroe Islands reached agreement 
for total TAC.  The EU was 





- 1,500 1,427 Cooperation 
1998
c 
- 1,300 1,223 Cooperation 
1999 1,263 1,300 1,235 Cooperation 
2000 Max 1,500 1,250 1,207 Cooperation 
2001 753 850 766 Cooperation 
2002 853 850 808 Cooperation 
2003 710 711
d 
790 Breakdown of cooperation 
2004 825 825
d 
794 Breakdown of cooperation 
2005 890 1,000
d 
1,003 Breakdown of cooperation 
2006 732 967 969 Breakdown of cooperation 
2007 1,280 1,280 1,267 Renewed cooperation 
2008 1,518 1,518 1,546 Renewed cooperation 
2009 1,643 1,642 1,687 Renewed cooperation 
2010 1,483 1,483 1,457 Renewed cooperation 





 Autonomous TACs were set by April 1996. 
c
 For 1996 and 1997, ICES advice was “keep SSB over 2.5 mill tonnes”, for 1998, it was “do 
not exceed the harvest control rule”.  For these three years, the advice was not quantified in 
tonnes. 
d
 The number is the sum of autonomous quotas for the individual parties. 
Source:  Bjørndal and Munro (2012); ICES WGWIDE Report 2012 for catch for 2010-11. 
 
The Norwegian spring spawning herring fishery provides a very interesting example 
with regard to the management of straddling fish stocks. As mentioned, when the stock was 
in a depressed state, it stayed fully in the Norwegian EEZ. (Bjørndal, et al., 2004) analysed 
cooperative and competitive management of this stock, including the question whether it 
might be profitable for Norway to break away from cooperation and maintain a lower stock 
that would remain under Norwegian control. This was not found to be profitable. The 
analysis showed that cooperation would give greater benefits than competition to all players, 
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and that, under no alternative considered, would it benefit a player to break away from 
cooperation in the long run. 
In the years 1997–2002, the partners agreed on the setting of the annual TAC and the 
shares for each country. The reason the agreement broke down in 2003 was because of 
Norwegian demands for a higher share of the TAC. These claims were based on the zonal 
attachment principle or the concept of “biomass by time’’ within the zones (stock size within 
a zone multiplied with the duration of the stay, see (Monstad, 2004). It turned out that the 
herring spent more time in the Norwegian EEZ than expected when the first agreement was 
reached and, based on this principle, Norway laid claim to a greater share of the quota. This 
showed that the original cooperative agreement was not time consistent. In the end, only 
minor adjustments to the quota shares were made. Although Norway's quota demands were 
not met, Norway preferred a cooperative agreement to a non-cooperative one. 
ICES classify the current status of the stock as having full reproductive capacity and 
being harvested sustainably. 
 
3.3. Blue Whiting  
Blue whiting (Micromesistius poutassou) is a pelagic gadoid that is widely distributed in the 
eastern part of the North Atlantic (ICES, 2007b). The highest concentrations are found along 
the edge of the continental shelf in areas west of the British Isles and on the Rockall Bank 
plateau where it occurs in large schools at depths ranging between 300 and 600 m. It is also 
present in almost all other management areas between the Barents Sea and the Strait of 
Gibraltar and west to the Irminger Sea (ICES, 2007b). 
Multi-national fishing for blue whiting started at the end of the 1970s, with 
participation mainly from the former Soviet Union (Russia) and Norway (see Standal, 2006). 
In most of the 1980s and 1990s, the catches were rather stable, however, the catches 
increased rapidly since 1998 (figure 4), and a new catch record was set almost every year, 
with catches over 2 million tonnes in 2003–2006.  Since then, there has been a substantial 
decline in catches, with 635,000 tonnes recorded for 2009. 
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Figure 4. Spawning Stock Biomass (SSB) 1981-2012 and Landings of Blue Whiting 1981–
2011 (million tonnes). 
Sources: ICES Advice 2010, Book 9 table 9.4.4.5 , Fishstat (catch from 1995 onwards) and 
ICES WGWIDE report 2012, Table 8.4.5 for 2010-2012 SSB. 
 
 
The blue whiting fishery was for a time the largest fishery in the North East Atlantic. 
Its total catch was in excess of two million tonnes in 2006. According to the official catch 
statistics of NEAFC, Norway accounted for 37% of the total catch in 2005, followed by the 
EU (19%), Russia (17%), Iceland (13%), and Faeroe Islands (13%). Annual catches by 
country for 1995–2009 are given in the appendix (table A3) and showed a very substantial 
increase until 2006, when they started to decline.  This was in line with developments in 
stock size.  The landings of blue whiting in the Convention Area in 2004 were 2,407,000 
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Figure 5.  Catches of blue whiting by country in the Northeast Atlantic, 1995–2011 (tonnes). 
Source: Appendix, table A4. 
 
 
The fishery has been regulated by a TAC system since 1994. NEAFC agreed to 
follow the advice from ACFM regarding an annual total catch quota, but for many years the 
coastal nations set their own quota, the sum of which far exceeded the recommendation from 
ICES (Standal, 2006). In 2003, for instance, catches of blue whiting reached a record high of 
almost 2.4 million tonnes (figure 5), whereas advised catch limit from ICES was around 
600,000 tonnes (ICES, 2004). 
ICES estimate the SSB (in 2010) to below Blim and F (in 2009) between Fpa and Flim. 
Year classes 2005-2009 are among the lowest observed. Due to recent low recruitment, SSB 
has declined from its historical peak in 2003-2004 of more than 6 million tonnes to 1.3 
million tonnes at the beginning of 2010. Based on the management plan, ICES calculated a 
TAC for 2011 at 40 100 tonnes. This TAC advice was later followed by NEAFC. 
In 2009 ICES advised on the basis of the agreed management plan (F=0.18) that 
catches in 2010 should be 540,000 tonnes. This advice has been followed quite closely (TAC 
548,000 tonnes). The advice for 2011 to follow the management plan (TAC 40,100 t) was 
also followed, however, the actual catches in 2010 were probably be more than twice as high 
due to quota transfers from 2010 and other reasons (ICES 2012). 
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The history leading up to the 2005 agreement is most interesting. Apart from the 
Russian Federation and Norway, which developed the fishery, the blue whiting was mainly 
fished by vessels from the Faeroe Islands and countries from the EU. Only minor fishing was 
carried out by Icelandic vessels until the mid-1990s (Table 4), when a new Icelandic fishery 
was initiated by a fleet of powerful vessels (Pálsson, 2005). As a consequence, the Icelandic 
catches of blue whiting increased rapidly, reaching 501,000 tonnes in 2003 (Bjørndal 2009). 
The virtually unregulated blue whiting fishery prior to 2006 appears to have been a 
very attractive strategy for further economic expansion for agents who otherwise fish for 
herring and mackerel within a system where the harvest quantity is strongly quota regulated 
and access to the resources is strictly limited (Standal, 2006). There has been a dramatic 
development in the pelagic fishing fleets from the late 1970s when vessels and equipment 
were not suitable for the blue whiting fishery. During the past 10–12 years, there has been a 
considerable modernisation of the fleet of combined purse seiners/blue whiting trawlers with 
high financial investments and, therefore, a great need for increased catch income. Vessels 
that were licensed to fish blue whiting faced few restrictions in this fishery, both with respect 
to quantity and time (Ekerhovd, 2007) and were able to gain maximum use of their catch 
capacity. Within the framework of licensed-regulated fishing, where only a limited numbers 
of participants can take part in the otherwise unregulated blue whiting fishery, we see that 
modern technology has a prominent position where development is accelerated by financial 
motives for largest possible profit.  
For many years the coastal states were not able to reach an agreement on the 
management of the blue whiting stock. One possible reason for this is pressure from the 
national fishermen organisations. Then, suddenly, when the fishermen agree, the coastal 
states follow. There are probably several reasons for this change in mode. One is that that the 
fishermen knew that the stock could not sustain such a high fishing mortality much longer 
without collapsing. Secondly, the catches were already decreasing compared to just a couple 
of years earlier, and this encouraged the vessel owners to find a solution as to how a TAC 
should be divided while there still was something to share. Another factor that was 
instrumental for the Norwegian vessel owners’ willingness to negotiate was that the 
extraordinary blue whiting fishery in Norwegian waters during summer and autumn had not 
been the success they had hoped it to be, and therefore did not back up Norway's claim to 
37% of TAC. 
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The various countries involved have presented alternative ways to show the biological 
zonal attachment of blue whiting. Some countries use the zonal attachment principle or the 
concept of “biomass by time’’ within the zones (stock size within a zone multiplied with the 
duration of the stay), while others exclusively employ the catch statistics from the zone as the 
basic concept. A combination of these two methods is also used, and in some cases other 
factors such as economic dependency on the fishery were also considered. The relevant 
parties presented demands for their own quota share along with what they thought the others’ 
shares should be, and the sum of each nation's claim amounted to almost 200% of a possible 
TAC. With regard to the blue whiting there exist two game theoretic studies (Ekerhovd 2010, 
2008). Ekerhovd (2010) analysed within the framework of non-cooperative, endogenous 
formation of coalitions and coalition structures the effects of distribution scenarios between 
the coastal states which can harvest blue whiting within their respective EEZ.  Russia is 
currently not recognized as a coastal state for blue whiting, but changing distribution may 
challenge this, with implications for the management. 
A multilateral agreement included an agreement to reduce fishing mortality to 
sustainable levels within three years. The CPs established an allowable catch limitation of 
1.25 million tonnes (NEAFC) of blue whiting for 2008. TAC allocations are as follows: 
European Community 350,000 tonnes; Faeroe Islands 300,000 tonnes; Norway 296,000 
tonnes, and Iceland 202,000 tonnes. 
On 16th December 2005, after six years of negotiations, the coastal states of the EU, 
Faeroe Islands, Iceland, and Norway signed an agreement. The agreement, starting in 2006, 
includes a long run management strategy that implies annual reductions in the landings until 
the management goals are reached (The Royal Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal 
Affairs, 2005-2006). This arrangement provided for catches in 2006 of 2 million tonnes 
(Norwegian Fisheries Website) allocated as follows: EU 30.5%, Faeroe Islands 26.125%, 
Norway 25.745% and Iceland 17.63%. Russia will be accommodated by transfers from some 
of the coastal states and additional catches in the NEAFC area (ICES, 2007c). In 2006, 
Russian catches represented 16.3% of total catches (Table 3). 
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Table 3. ICES's management advice on TAC for blue whiting: the expected landings (based 
on the recommendations), TAC agreed upon by the NEAFC Members, and Actual landings 
(‘000 tonnes). 
 




1994 Precautionary TAC (northern component); 
no recommendations on the southern 




1995 Precautionary TAC for combined stock 518 650
1
 579 
1996 Precautionary TAC for combined stock 500 650
1
 646 
1997 Precautionary TAC for combined stock 540  672 
1998 Precautionary TAC for combined stock 650  1,125 
1999 Landings > 650,000 t may  not be 
sustainable in the long run 
650  1,256 
2000 F should not exceed the proposed Fpa 800  1,412 
2001 F should not exceed the proposed Fpa 628  1,780 
2002 Rebuilding plan 0  1,556 
2003 F should not exceed the proposed Fpa 600  2,321 
2004 Achieve 50% probability that F will be less 
than Fpa 
925  2,378 
2005 Achieve 50% probability that F will be less 
than Fpa 
1,075  2,027 
2006 F old management plan 1,500 2,100
2
 1,966 
2007 F should be less than proposed Fpa 980 1,847
3
 1,612 
2008 F should be less than Fpa 835 1,250
4
 1,246 
2009 Maintain stock above Bpa 384 606
5
 636 
2010 Follow the agreed management plan 540 548 524 
2011 See scenarios  40 104 
2012   391  
Weights in ‘000 t.  
1
NEAFC proposal for NEAFC regions 1 and 2.  
2
Agreed TAC from four Coastal States of 2 million tonnes, and an additional allocation to 
Russia in the international zone of 100 000 t.  
3
Agreed TAC from four Coastal States of 1.7 million tonnes, and an additional allocation to 
Russia and Greenland of 147 000 t.  
4
Agreed TAC from four Coastal States of 1.1 million tonnes, and an additional allocation to 
Russia and Greenland.  
5
Agreed TAC from four Coastal States of 0.59 million tonnes, and an additional allocation to 
Russia (0.016 million tonnes). 
Source: ICES Advice 2010, Book 9 table 9.4.4.1; WGWIDE 2011 for 2011 landings; 
WGDWIDE 2012 for 2012 TAC. 
 
 
ICES classified the stock as having full reproductive capacity, but being harvested at 
increased risk. SSB increased to a historical high in 2003, but has decreased since then and 
was expected to be just above Bpa in 2009. The estimated fishing mortality was well above 
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Fpa. Recruitment of the 2005 and 2006 year classes were estimated to be in the very low end 
of the historical time-series. Surveys indicated that the 2007 year class could also be low.  
ICES has evaluated the 2006 management plan and found it not to be in accordance 
with the precautionary approach in a period of low recruitment. In July 2008 a new draft 
management plan was proposed by the Coastal States. ICES has evaluated the draft 
management plan and considers it precautionary if fishing mortality in the first year should 
immediately be reduced to the fishing mortality that is implied by the Harvest Control Rule 
(ICES 2009).  
 
4. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE FISHERIES 
As is clear from above, catches of the three species have varied considerably over time.  Total 
annual catch in the post 2000 period has varied between 2.95 and 3.8 million tonnes (table 4). 
 We have also made an estimate of total value of the three species.  This is done on the 
basis of Norwegian first hand prices (appendix, table A5). In other words, we assume all 
fishermen harvesting these three species fetch the same prices as Norwegian fishermen.   
In reality, prices vary not only by country but also by vessel group or technology 
(Lappo, 2013). More than that, Lappo (2013) also shows that Norwegian fishermen fetch 
higher prices for catches of these three species than do fishermen from the United Kingdom 
and Iceland. Accordingly, these estimates can only be considered an indication of the 
potential values involved. 
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of the three 
species mill 
NOK 
2000 3,307,617 6,254,917 
2001 3,220,142 8,774,930 
2002 3,050,517 9,684,655 
2003 3,763,616 7,961,399 
2004 3,800,365 9,758,097 
2005 3,510,177 11,304,725 
2006 3,413,643 9,420,111 
2007 3,414,291 9,545,686 
2008 3,370,618 11,502,097 
2009 2,953,840 10,286,549 
2010 2,850,297 12,211,253 
2011 2,035,409 16,917,657 
 
 Based on these assumptions, total nominal value per year varies between 6,255 
million NOK (2000) and 16,918 million NOK (2011).  The relative variation in value is much 
more substantial than that for quantities.  The changes in value over time can be explained by 
differences in the composition of the total catch and different prices for the different species 
as well as changes in these variables over time (Lappo, 2013). 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The pelagic fisheries of the North East Atlantic are all harvested by fishermen from the same 
five countries/parties: the EU, Norway, Faroe Islands, Iceland and Russia. However, the 
countries’ status is not equal in all fisheries. For instance, Russia is only regarded as a coastal 
state with regard to the Norwegian spring spawning herring while considered a Distant Water 
Fishing State (DWFS) with respect to the mackerel and blue whiting fisheries. Moreover, 
Iceland, a coastal state in the herring fishery, claims coastal state status with respect to blue 
whiting and mackerel. Initially contested, Iceland’s coastal state status in the blue whiting 
fishery was accepted by the other coastal states when they signed a management agreement in 
2005.   
Since the 1980s, the mackerel fishery was an issue between the EU and Norway, 
setting an overall catch quota and dividing it among themselves. Later, the Faroe Islands 
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came to participate in this arrangement. Iceland had not previously fished mackerel in any 
significant amounts, but began doing so when it migrated into its waters. Iceland was not 
satisfied with the quota offered by the others and unilaterally set a quota for itself. Soon after, 
the Faroese withdrew from the cooperation with EU and Norway, finding their quota 
allocation unacceptably low, compared with what Iceland was taking.  
 The quotas are set by the coastal states, which de facto manage the fisheries, instead 
of NEAFC, the relevant RFMO (Bjørndal, 2009). This explains the importance of being a 
coastal state, rather than a DWFS, however “real” the interest in the fishery may be. 
 Another trait in common among these fisheries is the fact that the management 
agreement has at some point in time been shown to lack the property of time consistency. The 
cooperative agreements either collapsed or there have been severe difficulties achieving 
cooperation. This happens when there are unforeseen changes in the migrations, distribution 
and abundance of the stocks.  
 One might think, since they are harvested by the same countries, that a way to 
overcome these difficulties must be to manage all three stocks jointly. However, for this to be 
the case, each country has to be a dominant player with respect to at least one stock. The 
problem is that the Faroe Islands and Iceland must be considered minor players with respect 
to all three stocks, and considering them jointly will not necessarily make an agreement any 
easier to achieve. 
 The management history of these three straddling fish stocks illustrates many of the 
problems that managers of such stocks are faced with all over the world. Also, these stocks 
are closely linked: their habitats overlap, and they are fished by the same fishermen from only 
a handful of countries. In spite of these similarities, they are managed, at least formally, as if 
they were unrelated; and although multispecies management is no guarantee for stable and 
resilient cooperation, we can ask if that would be a better way to proceed in the future. 
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APPENDIX 1.  DATA 
 
Table A1. Spawning Stock Biomass (SSB) and Catches (including discards) of Northeast 
Atlantic Mackerel 1980–2010 (million tonnes).  
 
Year SSB Catch 
1980 2.053704 0.73495 
1981 2.07611 0.754045 
1982 2.007181 0.716987 
1983 2.309138 0.672283 
1984 2.336643 0.641928 
1985 2.275007 0.614371 
1986 2.306482 0.602201 
1987 2.307153 0.654992 
1988 2.314265 0.680491 
1989 2.395977 0.58592 
1990 2.266356 0.626107 
1991 2.522688 0.675665 
1992 2.54466 0.76069 
1993 2.384252 0.824568 
1994 2.206047 0.819087 
1995 2.397397 0.756277 
1996 2.424668 0.563472 
1997 2.541173 0.573029 
1998 2.457824 0.666316 
1999 2.469329 0.640309 
2000 2.20595 0.738606 
2001 2.138374 0.737463 
2002 1.749298 0.772905 
2003 1.748701 0.6696 
2004 1.848672 0.650221 
2005 2.290881 0.543486 
2006 2.409602 0.472652 
2007 2.540759 0.579379 
2008 2.709395 0.612856 
2009 2.978321 0.734889 
2010 2.973  0.869 
2011 3.040  0.939 
 
Source: ICES Advice 2010, Book 9, table 9.4.2.7: ICES WGWIDE Report 2012 for 2010-11. 
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Table A2. Mackerel Catches by Country.  
 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Belgium 108 64 106 125 178 151 
Channel Islands 1 9 9 23 18 16 
Denmark 36,758 26,238 24,054 27,415 29,705 31,642 
Estonia 2,286 3,741 6,324 7,356 3,595 2,673 
Faroe Islands 34,924 19,530 8,401 10,654 11,334 21,022 
France 22,807 13,167 14,368 18,764 17,400 20,897 
Germany 24,417 16,229 15,864 21,490 19,960 22,980 
Iceland - 92 927 357 144 - 
Ireland 78,534 49,966 53,094 67,310 59,609 70,184 
Isle of Man 1 - - - 4 - 
Latvia 534 233 - - - - 
Lithuania 6,236 7,334 - 2,823 4,936 2,085 
Netherlands 35,787 24,246 23,702 30,163 27,816 32,403 
Norway 202,209 136,699 137,256 158,340 161,046 174,228 
Poland - - 22 - - - 
Portugal 3,073 3,009 2,083 2,898 2,035 2,254 
Romania 30,844 7,265 - - - - 
Russian 
Federation 
46,249 43,046 53,732 67,837 51,348 50,772 
Spain 10,595 13,748 20,301 25,541 24,026 25,384 
Sweden 6,268 5,387 4,390 5,161 5,003 4,500 
United Kingdom 218,417 144,964 149,448 179,711 166,658 193,638 
Total 760,048 514,967 514,081 625,968 584,815 654,829 
 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Belgium 98 23 4 5 1 4 
Channel Islands 14 12 15 16 19 18 
Denmark 31,395 33,046 26,425 26,250 23,214 24,234 
Estonia 218 - - - - - 
Faroe Islands 22,790 20,356 12,299 14,203 10,310 12,082 
France 20,958 22,070 27,463 23,315 18,297 17,366 
Germany 25,325 26,536 24,061 23,376 19,120 16,601 
Iceland 1 53 122 - 363 4,222 
Ireland 70,451 72,189 67,481 60,753 44,981 41,227 
Isle of Man 8 6 7 7 - - 
Latvia - - - - - - 
Lithuania 1,949 1,600 582 - - 92 
Netherlands 33,109 43,460 29,167 28,006 23,457 22,068 
Norway 180,750 184,382 163,535 157,432 119,878 122,011 
Poland - - - - 570 1,368 
Portugal 3,121 3,090 2,902 2,779 3,064 2,856 
Romania - - - - - - 
Russian Federation 41,568 45,811 40,026 49,489 40,506 33,580 
Spain 24,382 26,558 18,930 22,139 14,020 16,735 
Sweden 5,098 5,232 4,449 4,574 3,205 3,386 
United Kingdom 198,953 200,405 183,021 174,730 126,603 103,027 
Total 660,188 684,829 600,489 587,074 447,608 420,877 
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Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Belgium 1 2 4 29 21 
Channel Islands 12 14 16 6 17 
Denmark 24,888 26,730 23,230 41,455 35,966 
Estonia - - - - - 
Faroe Islands 14,124 11,920 14,469 70,987 122,050 
France 15,730 13,471 11,862 10,987 12,720 
Germany 18,574 15,422 22,408 19,055 24,085 
Iceland - 112,352 116,101 121,010 159,266 
Ireland 48,789 44,906 61,424 57,994 61,612 
Isle of Man 7 6 10 6 7 
Latvia - 7 - - - 
Lithuania 7 - 111 - 23 
Netherlands 24,773 20,395 23,419 23,084 34,500 
Norway 131,698 121,496 121,229 233,950 208,070 
Poland 978 2 - - - 
Portugal 3,031 2,954 2,733 22,283 ? 
Romania - - - -  
Russian Federation 35,674 32,728 41,428 59,292 73,601 
Spain 18,678 16,512 13,952 28,209 30,808 
Sweden 3,936 3,662 7,303 3,428 3,248 
United Kingdom 133,700 124,927 171,984 160,400 180,970 
Total 474,600 547,506 631,683 893,130 1,014,900 
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Table A3. Blue Whiting by Country  
 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Channel Islands - - 1 1 1 - 
Denmark 46,182 52,699 33,486 69,305 79,810 62,074 
Estonia 13,715 10,982 5,678 6,321 - - 
Faroe Islands 25,936 21,483 28,773 71,217 105,106 152,687 
France 6 6,442 12,446 7,992 6,343 16,042 
Germany 6,314 6,865 4,722 17,970 3,170 12,654 
Greenland - - - - - - 
Iceland 369 513 10,480 68,514 160,424 259,157 
Ireland 222 1,709 25,987 45,538 35,880 26,067 
Japan 1,127 - - - - - 
Lithuania 400 651 - - 1,231 - 
Netherlands 22,685 16,407 24,132 27,693 32,889 43,145 
Norway 261,362 356,054 348,268 570,665 534,570 553,478 
Poland - - - - - - 
Portugal 2,346 3,565 2,448 1,900 2,676 2,169 
Russian Federation 93,824 87,310 118,656 130,042 182,637 241,905 
Spain 33,397 30,262 37,900 30,549 30,926 28,000 
Sweden 13,000 4,038 4,568 6,034 15,511 3,362 
United Kingdom 5,495 14,326 33,701 98,936 106,491 45,048 
Total 526,380 613,306 691,246 1,152,677 1,297,665 1,445,788 
 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Channel Islands - - - - - - 
Denmark 65,067 51,040 87,966 89,523 39,107 58,183 
Estonia - - - - - - 
Faroe Islands 258,334 204,524 326,593 316,868 267,447 320,592 
France 19,054 14,771 16,121 19,476 7,160 21,921 
Germany 19,059 17,052 26,988 15,294 22,823 36,442 
Greenland - - - - - 6,517 
Iceland 365,101 286,381 501,494 422,078 265,889 314,755 
Ireland 29,910 17,825 22,586 58,426 69,650 54,910 
Japan - - - - - - 
Lithuania - - - - - 4,636 
Netherlands 63,625 35,624 57,257 77,183 128,368 96,607 
Norway 573,686 557,684 851,395 958,768 738,599 642,452 
Poland - 38 297 345 - 3,891 
Portugal 1,763 1,698 3,527 5,749 7,675 2,650 
Russian Federation 315,586 298,367 360,160 346,762 332,240 329,400 
Spain 28,822 25,522 23,825 29,021 50,095 48,355 
Sweden 2,058 18,483 65,532 19,957 4,385 314 
United Kingdom 51,889 28,679 29,386 59,841 126,131 82,141 
Total 1,793,954 1,557,688 2,373,127 2,419,291 2,059,569 2,023,766 
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Year 2007 2008 2009 
Channel Islands - - - 
Denmark 52,656 17,997 247 
Estonia - - - 
Faroe Islands 312,005 229,537 58,324 
France 19,943 19,943 6,981 
Germany 34,679 25,293 5,023 
Greenland 5,389 5,215 60 
Iceland 234,952 163,794 120,197 
Ireland 31,092 22,852 9,250 
Japan - - - 
Lithuania 9,812 5,365 - 
Netherlands 80,730 78,781 35,758 
Norway 539,589 418,289 225,996 
Poland 7,573 - - 
Portugal 3,933 4,752 2,137 
Russian Federation 252,277 225,163 149,649 
Spain 31,078 21,980 15,182 
Sweden 517 - 3 
United Kingdom 56,466 38,151 6,350 
Total 1,672,691 1,277,112 635,157 
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Table A4. Catches of blue whiting by country in the Northeast Atlantic, 1995–2011 (tonnes). 
Country 1995
a
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Norway 261,362 356,054 348,268 570,665 534,570 553,478 
Russian 
Federation 93,824 87,310 118,656 130,042 182,637 241,905 
Faeroe 
Islands 25,936 21,483 28,773 71,217 105,106 152,687 
Iceland 369 513 10,480 68,514 160,424 259,157 
EU 143,762 147,946 185,068 312,238 314,927 238,561 
Total 526,380 613,306 691,246 1,152,677 1,297,665 1,445,788 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Norway 573,686 557,684 851,396 958,768 738,599 642,452 
Russian 
Federation 315,586 298,367 360,160 346,762 332,240 329,400 
Faeroe 
Islands 258,334 204,524 326,593 316,868 267,447 320,592 
Iceland 365,101 286,381 501,494 422,078 265,889 314,755 
EU 281,247 210,732 333,485 374,815 455,394 421,539 
Total 1,793,954 1,557,688 2,373,128 2,419,291 2,059,569 2,028,738 
 2007 2008 2009 2010
b 
2011  
Norway 539,589 418,289 225,996 194,317 20,539  
Russian 
Federation 252,277 225,163 149,649 112,553 45,841  
Faeroe 
Islands 312,005 229,537 58,324 49,979 16,405  
Iceland 234,952 163,794 120,197 87,942 5,887  
EU 337,304 240,286 85,154 79,041 14,920  
Total 1,676,127 1,277,069 639,320 523,832 103,592  
 
a
 Japanese catch of 1,127 tonnes are included in 1995 total. 
Source: FAO FISHSTAT 
b
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Table A5. Prices per kg. 
 
Year NSSH Mackerel 
Blue 
whiting 
2000 1.70 5.16 0.57 
2001 3.82 6.93 0.71 
2002 3.79 7.35 1.02 
2003 2.66 6.36 0.86 
2004 3.61 8.36 0.82 
2005 4.19 12.60 0.71 
2006 3.30 8.87 1.23 
2007 2.50 7.80 1.60 
2008 2.71 10.93 1.04 
2009 2.47 8.25 1.43 
2010 2.94 8.14 1.91 
2011 5.30 12.04 3.45 
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1
 NEAFC also has other Regulatory Areas but not of relevance to this article. 
2
 This section draws heavily on Bjørndal and Munro (2007 and 2012). 
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The purpose of this paper is to give an overview over the fisheries for Norwegian 
spring spawning herring, mackerel and blue whiting and analyse how they are managed. 
The stocks under consideration are harvested by coastal states and distant water 
fishing states (DWFS).  For herring, however, Norway, Russia, Iceland, the Faroe 
Islands and the EU are all coastal states with the stock not being exploited by any 
DWFS.  There have been difficulties in reaching agreement of the management for 
all three stocks. The reason for these problems is that the distribution of the stocks 
and the different countries’ fishing opportunities have changed from time to time, 
putting the existing management arrangement under pressure. Here we review the 
management and current sustainability of the fisheries.
